

The Murder Mystery of the Assassination of Sakine Cansiz

Part 3: U.S. Vested Interests in Turkey

February 1, 2013 by Amy L. Beam, Ed.D.

Wikileaks US Embassy Cables Target PKK and Sakine Cansiz

Following are excerpts from cables sent from the US Embassy in Ankara to Washington, DC, and published by Wikileaks in 2010. They demonstrate US cooperation with Turkey since 2007 to fly drones over Turkey, share intelligence, target the PKK, sell attack helicopters, missiles, and drones to Turkey, and **focus on eliminating top PKK leadership, especially Sakine Cansiz.**

If the links to the embassy cables are broken, use this URL and append the cable number to the end:

<http://cablegatesearch.wikileaks.org/cable.php?id=>

Example: <http://cablegatesearch.wikileaks.org/cable.php?id=09ANKARA1472>

US - Turkey Launch Partnership to Target PKK

Cable [07ANKARA2867](#) sent to the Secretary of Defense in Washington, DC, Dec 1, 2007, confirmed US military intel support since Nov 5, 2007, in strikes against PKK. Presumably a US drone located a PKK camp, passed that intelligence to the Turkish military, which then fired on the camp.

[07ANKARA2867](#)

Turkish artillery fired on a terrorist PKK camp in the eastern Zap region along Iraq's northern border . . . The Turkish action took place pursuant to the **cooperation launched following PM Erdogan's November 5 meeting with President Bush.** . . . Within an hour of the strike, CHOD General Buyukanit called Ambassador to thank the US for its help. He commended **US-Turkish efforts since November 5.** . . . Media attributed actionable intelligence obtained from the USG with helping TGS locate the PKK targets. In addition to reports that Cobra helicopters bombed the PKK camp . . .

Sakine Cansiz Targeted

Cable [07ANKARA2917](#) sent to the Secretary of Defense in Washington, DC, Dec 7, 2007, summarized talking points with Ankara, including going after Sakine Cansiz.

[07ANKARA2917](#)

As the United States works together with Turkey to implement the **President's directive for effective action against PKK terror,** we must also redouble our efforts to shut down the financial support that flows from Europe into PKK headquarters located in northern Iraq. . . . The USG will need to work intensively on three simultaneous efforts:

-- First, we need to identify and **interdict PKK money** that is flowing into northern Iraq.

-- Second, we will push the Turks to work more effectively to identify and interdict financial flows. MASAK, Turkey's Financial Crimes Investigation Board, needs to . . . work more effectively with financial police, prosecutors, and judges to effectuate successful prosecutions.

-- Third, we should more sharply focus our work with the Europeans. . . . **by going after . . . Sakine Cansiz.** . . . We can help by providing the most extensive dossiers possible and coordinating with law enforcement and intelligence counterparts in Europe to **ensure these two terrorists are incarcerated.**

The cable ended with a note of complaint about the Iraqi government:

The apparent lack of legal authority for the government to seize assets prior to conviction might be a major roadblock.

What a nuisance to have to go through a trial and get a conviction before seizing assets, unlike what PayPal and MasterCard did to Wikileaks donations.

Turkey Asks U.S. for "Kinetic Action"

Cable [09ANKARA1472](#) sent to the Secretary of Defense in Washington, DC, Oct. 13, 2009, summarized talking points with Ankara including Ankara's request for the US to engage in "[kinetic action](#)," ie, US strikes against the PKK. Did the US agree to the request? One must wonder.

[09ANKARA1472](#)

Repeat our commitment to our intel and other **support for strikes against the PKK**

Our **2007 decision to share operational intelligence** was a turning point for the bilateral relationship,

Due to pressure on Chief of Staff General Basbug and the Turkish General Staff (TGS) to "finish off" the PKK this year, the government wants and has requested **direct U.S. kinetic action against the PKK**; we have refused this request to date due to our own rules of engagement.

Turkey seeks to acquire, on an urgent basis, its own UAV capability. The administration has made clear at high levels that we support this goal, and Turkey has pending **request to acquire armed Reaper UAVs.**

Additionally, bad procurement decisions led Turkey to a severe shortage of attack helicopters, desperately needed for its fight against the PKK. Turkey has looked to us to help them bridge the capability gap, **asking to purchase additional AH-1W Super Cobra aircraft.** These aircraft are in short supply in our own inventory, but Secretary Gates and VCJCS Cartwright have promised to try to support with request within a few years (**four each in 2011, 2012, and 2013**).

War for Profit

Cable [10ANKARA251](#) described a meeting held Feb 6, 2010, in Ankara between US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Turkish Minister of National Defense and Chief of the Turkish General Staff. Turkey thanked the US for its ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) support. Turkey asked for assistance in eliminating the PKK leadership and increased drone coverage. The US urged Turkey to buy Raytheon PAC-3 Patriot missile systems in return for them being manufactured in Turkey. Turkey could sell them to Gulf States **for hundreds of millions of dollars.**

[10ANKARA251](#)

Basbug raised the issue of Turkey's protracted fight against the PKK, highlighting **progress over the past year due to the elimination of key leaders.** . . . this was the result of increased U.S.-Turkish cooperation since the end of 2007, including intelligence sharing, provision of ISR support, and use U.S. UAV assets . . . Basbug said that in order to continue to eliminate the PKK threat, **Turkey needs more support from all stakeholders to pursue the top PKK leadership.** . . .

Addressing Turkey's outstanding Reaper UAV requests, SecDef reaffirmed to Basbug that the **U.S. is committed to the sale of Reapers to Turkey,** but offered the caveat that the sale would first have to be approved by Congress. SecDef added that the Pentagon is also looking at additional reconnaissance capabilities in addition to the Predators currently flown by the U.S. . . . Regarding current UAV support -- which already provides an average of 16-17 hours of coverage daily -- SecDef said that Gen Odierno will look at ways to surge up to 24-hour coverage when necessary, e.g. for operations involving high-value targets. . . .

SecDef emphasized that Turkey's dialogue with KRG was very important. In his meeting the previous week with KRG President Barzani, SecDef said he pressed him once again to work with the PKK to persuade them to abandon violence. Basbug agreed and said Turkey's dialogue with the KRG was particularly important as a measure to persuade the KRG to take a more proactive approach to the PKK. . . .

Basbug expressed concern about the U.S. drawdown of forces from Iraq, lamenting that while Turkey has been successful in **reducing the PKK threat,** it will be difficult to finish off the threat after U.S. forces leave. He concluded that **Turkey would need to "finish the problem" before the U.S. drawdown was complete.** . . .


Acquisition Advocacy

During his meeting with Gonul, SecDef advised that Turkey had opportunities to increase its military capabilities while gaining **economic benefits by selecting U.S. companies** in currently open tenders. First, Sikorsky, . . . **A second opportunity involves the co-production of Raytheon PAC-3 Patriot systems. Demand for these systems in the Gulf States could potentially yield hundreds of millions of dollars in export revenue.** SecDef stressed that "nothing can compete with the PAC-3 when it comes to capabilities." These opportunities are a chance for Turkey to earn revenue while simultaneously enhancing capabilities and creating jobs.

U.S. Supports Turkey in Destroying the PKK: The Roboski Massacre

On Dec 15, 2011, the day after officially withdrawing US troops from Iraq, [U.S. Defense Secretary Panetta held meetings](#) in Ankara to sign a \$111 million deal for the US to sell attack helicopters to Turkey and move its drones from Iraq to Turkey to help Turkey destroy the PKK.

Two weeks later, on Dec 28, 2011, the [Roboski Massacre](#) occurred in which [34 innocent Kurds](#) were killed by Turkish airstrikes after US drone intelligence identified their location. Each country blames the other for this "mistake." The massacre sent a clear message that the mountainous routes between northern Iraq (PKK headquarters) and Turkey were to be closed, thus dividing Iraqi Kurds from Turkish Kurds and making it difficult to deliver money to PKK headquarters in Quandil. The US position is that Iraqi Kurds are the *good* Kurds and Turkish Kurds, represented by the PKK, are the *bad* Kurds.



In exchange for the US-Turkey drone deal, Turkey allowed NATO to establish its radar missile base near Malatya.

Defense Secretary Panetta met again in Ankara, exactly one year later, on Dec. 14, 2012, to announce the US would deploy Patriot missiles to the border of Turkey and Syria with the intention of creating a buffer zone between the countries. This will effectively divide Turkish Kurds from Syrian Kurds, who are fighting the FSA (backed by Turkey and the United States).

Please continue to Part 4 of 5:

[The Murder Mystery of Sakine Cansiz Part 1: The Crime](#)

[The Murder Mystery of Sakine Cansiz Part 2: the Kurdish Issue and Free Speech](#)

[The Murder Mystery of Sakine Cansiz Part 3: US Vested Interests in Turkey](#)

[The Murder Mystery of Sakine Cansiz Part 4: Omer Guney, Accused Assassin](#)

[The Murder Mystery of Sakine Cansiz Part 5: Turkish MIT Accused](#)

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<http://climbingmountararat.blogspot.com> *Love and Betrayal in Kurdistan*